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TEACHER PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Maya Syngal McGrath*
When American citizens elect to work in government positions, they
relinquish certain free speech rights granted by the First Amendment. In
Garcetti v. Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their government job duties, they do
not speak as citizens for First Amendment purposes. As such, they are not
constitutionally insulated from employer discipline. Determining whether
public employees speak as a result of, or in accordance with, their official
responsibilities can be difficult, and one government job has proven more
challenging than most: the public school teacher. In 2021, the Ninth Circuit
held in Kennedy v. Bremerton that a high school football coach’s official
duty was to serve as a role model to his students, such that any speech he
made in that capacity, including his personal religious prayer, was not
entitled to First Amendment protection. The Ninth Circuit, in its efforts to
shield students from religious conduct, has left little protection for public
school employees to engage in any type of private speech at school.
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of a coach’s
official duties improperly expands Garcetti’s scope and extinguishes the
freedom for public school employees to engage in private religious
expression at school. This Note reasons that teachers and coaches do not
always speak pursuant to their job duties when they engage in speech in front
of students, and it urges the Supreme Court to carve out a private prayer
exception that requires the government to justify disciplinary action by
demonstrating a compelling state interest. This Note simultaneously
recognizes that safeguards are necessary to protect students’ free exercise
rights. When a public school’s instructional employee places undue pressure
on students to engage in religious activity, this Note contends that the
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prevention of this coercive Establishment Clause violation can serve as one
such compelling interest, overriding a teacher’s right to pray.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect.1

In 2015, Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, was suspended
after praying on the fifty-yard line following his team’s games.2 In 2021, the
Ninth Circuit held that his prayer was not protected speech under the First
Amendment.3 The court found that Kennedy spoke pursuant to his job as a
coach when he engaged in personal prayer in earshot of surrounding players,
and was therefore not entitled to private speech protection under the First

1. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
2. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. (Kennedy III), 991 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir.),
reh’g denied, 4 F.4th 910 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(mem.).
3. See id. at 1015.
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Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.4 The Ninth Circuit
further held that even if his speech was private expression, the school’s fear
of a potential Establishment Clause5 violation justified suspending Kennedy
from his job.6
Kennedy’s prayer rights intersect three labyrinthine clauses of the First
Amendment: the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Free Speech Clause. As an initial matter, religious expression in public
schools naturally implicates the Establishment Clause,7 which prevents the
government—and government employees—from carrying out conduct that
could have the effect of establishing a state religion.8 Since 1962, the U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently declared that state-sponsored prayer in
schools is unconstitutional, finding in Engel v. Vitale9 that opening class with
a recitation of prayer was equivalent to establishing a state religion.10
In the following two decades, the Court created and applied analytical
frameworks to assess the constitutionality of religious conduct in schools.11
These tests focus on whether the school places undue pressure on students to
engage in religious activity, whether that religious activity has a primary
secular purpose, and whether the school’s actions signify an endorsement of
religious views by the State.12 Establishment Clause jurisprudence hinges
on the actions of the school; the Court has yet to confront an Establishment
Clause case hinging on the religious prayer of an individual school
employee.13 Because previous Supreme Court litigants raised Establishment
Clause challenges to school-sponsored prayer—rather than asserting free
exercise and free speech violations like Kennedy did—the full implication of
school prayer cases on individual First Amendment rights remains
unexplored.14
4. U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”); see also Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at
1015.
5. U.S CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
6. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1016.
7. Charles J. Russo & Allan G. Osborne, Commentary, Prayer and Public School
Employees: To Pray or Not to Pray?, 391 EDUC. L. REP. 407, 424 (2021).
8. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (“[E]ach separate government in
this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave
that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look
to for religious guidance.”).
9. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
10. See id. at 436.
11. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Story
of Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: God and Football in Texas, in EDUCATION
LAW STORIES 319, 319–20 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007).
12. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587–88 (1992).
13. See infra Part I.A.1.
14. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (“We can decide the case without reconsidering the
general constitutional framework by which public schools’ efforts to accommodate religion
are measured.”).
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While the Constitution forbids the establishment of state religion, it
fiercely protects the free speech and free exercise rights of American
citizens.15 This delicate balance extends to the school setting as well—with
additional limitations.16 Schools have discretion to impose reasonable
regulations on speech, so long as those regulations do not target the viewpoint
of that speech.17 However, the Supreme Court has stressed that secondary
schools are critical to furthering intellectual debate and contributing to the
marketplace of ideas.18 It has therefore sought to amply protect nonreligious
and religious speech alike.19 Though most Supreme Court litigation has
focused on the free speech rights of students, the Court has indicated that
these same protections and exceptions extend to teachers.20
Moreover, teachers, by virtue of their government employment, relinquish
some additional First Amendment rights.21 When public employees are fired
or otherwise disciplined for speech made pursuant to their job
responsibilities, they are not entitled to free speech protection under the First
Amendment.22 Constitutionally, such speech is considered state speech
rather than private speech.23 Determining whether a public employee’s
speech is private or public is especially challenging in the school setting.24
Teachers have broad responsibilities, including choosing curricula, running
classroom debates, and serving as role models for students.25 The Supreme
Court has not addressed whether all public school employees’ speech is
regulable as within the scope of their job responsibilities.26 Consequently,
circuit courts are divided on the question.27 The first step in determining
15. See U.S CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses were
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequently applied to the states. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
16. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969);
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (finding that the most stringent free speech protection “does not even
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force”);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1109
(2019). The First Amendment generally prevents the government from proscribing speech or
expressive conduct because of its disapproval of the ideas being expressed. See R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
17. See Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Application of First Amendment in School Context—
Supreme Court Cases, 57 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, § 2 (2011). However, schools can restrict speech
that is lewd, vulgar, offensive, elicits drug use, or causes a substantial disruption. See Paul
Forster, Note, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in
Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 691 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
19. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
20. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
21. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
22. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
23. See id.
24. See Mark Strasser, Pickering, Garcetti, & Academic Freedom, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 579,
606, 609–10 (2018).
25. See infra Part.II.B.2.
26. See infra Part II.B.2.
27. See infra Part II.B.1.
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whether teachers and coaches have the right to engage in religious expression
in front of their students is to establish whether public school employees have
private speech rights at school.28
This Note assesses whether the prayer of a public school instructional
employee, made on school premises, is private speech protected by the First
Amendment, and if so, whether the Establishment Clause can nevertheless
override that constitutional protection. It analyzes the circuit courts’
application of free speech protections for public school employees and
examines the Establishment Clause implications of employee prayer. This
Note argues that teachers do not always speak pursuant to their job duties
when they engage in religious speech in front of students. It posits that
personal prayer should be granted special protection requiring the
government to justify disciplinary action by demonstrating a compelling state
interest. Moreover, this Note reasons that an Establishment Clause violation
can serve as a compelling governmental interest only if there is a valid
concern that the employee prayer places undue pressure on students to
engage in religious activity.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Free Speech Clause
jurisprudence regarding prayer and religious speech in secondary schools.
Part II introduces the diminished free speech rights of government employees
under Garcetti v. Ceballos29 and examines the challenges that occur when
public school employees engage in private speech. It then lays out the
landscape of circuit court cases involving employee-initiated religious
expression, particularly as applied in Kennedy v. Bremerton School
District.30 Part III proposes an exception to Garcetti for public school
employees’ extracurricular speech that grants First Amendment protection to
private speech and prayer. To account for the competing Establishment
Clause concerns, this Note maintains that a public school employee’s free
speech rights may be overridden if the employee is a state actor who
psychologically coerces students into participating in religious practice.
I. THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND FREE SPEECH IN SCHOOL
This part introduces the three distinct First Amendment clauses that
intersect in public school religious speech and prayer cases. Part I.A.
28. See, e.g., Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct.
857 (2022) (mem.).
29. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
30. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this
case and scheduled oral arguments for spring 2022. Harper Neidig, Supreme Court Agrees to
Hear Case on HS Coach’s Suspension Over On-Field Prayers, THE HILL (Jan. 14, 2022, 5:30
PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/589849-supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-caseon-hs-coachs-suspension-over-on?amp [https://perma.cc/KM6Y-3986]; see also Amy Howe,
Court Will Take Up Five New Cases, Including Lawsuit from Football Coach Who Wanted to
Pray on Field, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 14, 2022, 8:08 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/
01/court-will-take-up-five-new-cases-including-lawsuit-from-football-coach-who-wantedto-pray-on-the-field/ [https://perma.cc/6FPK-KAXM].
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describes public school prayer cases and their treatment under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (collectively, “Religion Clauses”).
Part I.B. provides an overview of free speech jurisprudence in public schools.
A. Public School Prayer and the Religion Clauses
The First Amendment reflects the framers’ expectation that the
government should neither compel nor punish religious practice.31 The
Religion Clauses together serve many vital purposes, including protecting
freedom of religious belief, preventing state coercion to engage in religious
activity, and forbidding sectarian discrimination.32 However, an inherent
tension persists between the clauses.33 The Establishment Clause primarily
serves to treat every citizen equally, while the Free Exercise Clause primarily
promotes religious liberty.34 Nowhere has this tension between the
separation of church and state and the accommodation of the free exercise of
religion been more apparent than in American public schools.35 Expectedly,
the Supreme Court has long grappled with striking the appropriate balance
for religious expression in the public school setting.36 Part I.A.1 discusses
how the Court has assessed the effect of the Establishment Clause on prayer
in public school, and Part I.A.2 discusses the relevant consequences of the
Free Exercise Clause’s application to such conduct.
1. Public School Prayer and the Establishment Clause
Because public schools are run by the State, they must adhere to the
Establishment Clause’s prohibitions.37 The Establishment Clause38 prevents
the government—and government employees—from carrying out conduct
that could have the ultimate effect of establishing a state religion.39 This

31. See U.S CONST. amend. I.
32. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 567 (1991).
33. See Sarah M. Isgur, Note, “Play in the Joints”: The Struggle to Define Permissive
Accommodation Under the First Amendment, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 371–72
(2008).
34. See Lupu, supra note 32, at 568 (“The prohibition on laws respecting establishment is
primarily an equal liberty provision; only secondarily is it concerned with religious liberty.”).
35. See Theresa Lynn Sidebotham, Expression of Religion in Public Schools, 40 COLO.
LAW. 47, 47 (2011) (citing Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1053 (10th Cir. 1990)).
36. See Brett Geier & Ann E. Blankenship-Knox, When Speech Is Your Stock in Trade:
What Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Reveals About the Future of Employee Speech
and Religion Jurisprudence, 42 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 76 (2020) (“Balancing when and how
religion . . . may be expressed in public schools by both students and employees has proved
challenging for the . . . Court.”).
37. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 430 (1962).
38. U.S CONST. amend. I.
39. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 435. States are subject to the Establishment Clause’s
protections through the clause’s incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
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conduct can range from displaying a crèche in a town square40 to sponsoring
prayer in schools.41
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of state-led prayer
in public schools in 1962.42 In Engel v. Vitale,43 a New York state official
directed school principals to lead prayers in class at the start of each school
day, a routine that one school adopted into its official policy.44 The Court,
in its 6–1 decision, found that New York’s state prayer program, despite its
allowance for students to opt out of praying, effectively established religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause.45 A year later in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,46 the Court reviewed a Pennsylvania law
that required school administrators to read verses from the Bible at the
opening of each school day.47 This statute permitted parents to excuse their
students from joining the recitation of the prayer.48 The Court nonetheless
affirmed that reading these prayers compelled students to practice religion,
in violation of their free exercise rights and the Establishment Clause.49 The
Court underscored in Engel and Schempp that, because the prayer exercises
occurred during instructional time and in front of students who were required
to attend school, they were curricular, coercive activities.50 This concept of
psychological coercion predated the more utilitarian frameworks that were
developed in later Establishment cases, and it has remained a dormant
standard in school prayer cases.51
Ten years later, the Supreme Court developed the Lemon test, the first
formal standard for assessing Establishment Clause violations.52 In Lemon
40. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989).
41. See Engel, 370 U.S at 435; Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation
Ceremonies: An Exercise in Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 6.
42. See Engel, 370 at 424.
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. See id. at 423 (“These state officials composed the prayer which they recommended
and published as a part of their ‘Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools,’
saying: ‘We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and women of good
will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program.’”). The prayer that
students had to recite was as follows: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.” Id. at
422.
45. See id. at 430.
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
47. See id. at 205.
48. See id. at 224–25 (noting that these prayers are not “mitigated by the fact that
individual students may absent themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no
defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause”).
49. See id. at 224.
50. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 701 (1992) (“[O]rganized school prayer inculcates
even as it accommodates, making it impossible to distinguish ‘independent religious choice’
from conformity to authority.”); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221. Engel and Schempp made
the first references to psychological coercion, which Justice Anthony Kennedy later picked up
on in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
51. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451,
456, 458 (1995).
52. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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v. Kurtzman,53 the Court evaluated the constitutionality of state statutes that
provided funding for books, supplies, and teacher salaries at private parochial
schools.54 The Court articulated three ways in which the state may violate
the Establishment Clause: (1) if the state action lacks a secular purpose,
(2) if the primary effect of the state action either advances or inhibits religion,
(3) if the state action amounts to excessive entanglement with religion.55
While the Lemon test was the first fixed standard of modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, the Court has moved away from the framework over
time, significantly in Establishment Clause cases not involving state
funding.56 Some Justices have considered the test wholly inadequate57 or
have tinkered with its application.58
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sought to correct some of the pitfalls of the
Lemon test and articulated a new standard in Lynch v. Donnelly59—the
endorsement test.60 The test looks at whether a government action or practice
is perceived by the public as an endorsement of religion.61 In retaining some
of the language from Lemon, Justice O’Connor additionally asked whether
the government “intend[ed] to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion.”62 Though Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test has
been primarily used to assess cases involving religious symbols,63 the Court
partially employed her framework when deciding another school prayer case
a year after Lynch.64

53. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. Id. at 609–11.
55. See id. at 615, 623; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218 (1997).
56. See Ronna Greff Schneider, Getting Help with Their Homework: Schools, Lower
Courts, and the Supreme Court Justices Look for Answers Under the Establishment Clause,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 943, 948–52 (2001); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246,
2265 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does
the wall theory upon which it rests. . . . The three-part test has simply not provided adequate
standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases . . . .”); see also William P. Marshall, “We
Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495,
518 (1986); Jesse Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An
Update, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 496 (1986).
58. See Schneider, supra note 56, at 948–52. The Supreme Court has at times combined
the last two elements to make a “purpose” prong and “effects” prong. See id. at 950
(“Interestingly, . . . the Court . . . transformed the three prong Lemon test into a two prong test
by eliminating excessive entanglement as an independent factor . . . .”).
59. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
60. See id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
61. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 690.
63. See David L. Hudson Jr., Endorsement Test, First Amendment Encyclopedia,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/833/endorsement-test
[https://perma.cc/
9GLS-WD5B] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022); see also B.J. Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in
Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 492 (2005).
64. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 51 (“The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’” (quoting
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))).
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,65 the Court declared unconstitutional an Alabama
statute that authorized a daily period of silence for meditation or voluntary
prayer.66 The Court incorporated components of Lemon along with the
endorsement principle that Justice O’Connor had proposed the year prior,
finding that the statute endorsed religion because it lacked a clear secular
purpose.67 In Jaffree, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion, noting
that nothing in the Constitution or the Court’s jurisprudence prohibited public
school students from voluntarily praying during school.68 She concluded that
the Alabama statute, as applied, attempted to convey a message that religion
or a specific religious belief is favored.69
The Supreme Court justices have disagreed on how the government should
apply the principle of neutrality toward religion,70 holding disparate beliefs
on the instances in which government may accommodate religion.71 In his
separate opinion in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,72
a case involving religious symbols, Justice Anthony Kennedy proposed the
coercion test that had been previously introduced in Engel.73 He wrote that
the Establishment Clause gave latitude to the government to acknowledge
and accommodate the role of religion in the state,74 and articulated two
principles limiting the government’s ability to accommodate religion: “[The
action] may not coerce anyone to . . . participate in religion or its exercise;
and it may not . . . give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that that it
in fact ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”75
The use of coercion as an official element of an Establishment Clause
analysis raised questions among the justices.76 The majority found that
coercion alone would be sufficient but not necessary for finding a valid
Establishment Clause violation.77

65. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
66. See id. at 61.
67. See id. at 56.
68. See id. at 67 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
69. The Court performed a textual analysis and examined the statute’s legislative history
to determine that the Alabama legislators solely intended to promote religious prayer in
school. See id. at 58–59.
70. See id. at 82. Some justices have pointed out that the Court has not applied the
principle of neutrality consistently. See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of
Religions?: Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment
Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2006).
71. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
73. Justice Kennedy concurred with the judgment in part and dissented in part. See id. at
655–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 656–59.
75. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
76. 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 1:3 (2019).
77. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 627–28. Justice Kennedy opined that the use of
endorsement was an unwelcome addition to the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
See id. at 668.
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In Lee v. Weisman,78 the Court used psychological coercion as a factor
when it returned to considering the constitutionality of school prayer.79 In
Lee, a school principal invited clergymen to deliver nonsectarian prayers as
invocations and benedictions at a middle school graduation.80 The Court
clarified in Lee that prayer and religious exercise in public schools should be
subject to a unique constitutional analysis.81 Relevant to that analysis is
whether students are compelled to exercise religion at school, which the
Court found happened in Lee.82
The Court warned against the undue pressure that a clergy invocation
could place on students to engage in prayer.83 The majority found that the
public peer pressure to maintain respectful silence during a clergy invocation
at a school ceremony could be as “palpable” as legal compulsion.84 It
additionally asserted that respectful silence of the audience members while
observing prayer during a school ceremony is distinct from legislative
meetings, where prayer is permissible, due to the high degree of control that
the school exhibits over students.85 The principal’s actions induced students
to conform to and participate in religious exercise, which the Court found
constitutionally impermissible.86
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in Lee and objected to the majority’s
reasoning on two grounds.87 First, he maintained that school prayer is akin
to legislative prayer and that these types of prayer are consistent with
constitutional history and tradition and therefore should apply to public
school noncurricular ceremonies as well.88 Second, he reasoned that the
majority created a psychological coercion component that was inconsistent
with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.89 Justice Scalia
pointed out that while school prayer can be distinct from other types of
78. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
79. See id. at 592; see also Greene, supra note 51, at 451–52.
80. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 582–83. In Lee, there was no legislation or written school policy
at issue—only the actions of the school principal were at issue. He chose the religious
participant, decided that an invocation should be delivered and distributed guidelines to the
clergymen prior to the ceremony. The Court found, through his actions, that the school’s
“involvement” served as a choice attributable to the State, akin to a state statute providing for
prayer recitation in schools. Id. at 580, 586–87.
81. See id. at 585, 597.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 592 (noting that what could “begin as [the government’s] tolerant expression
of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce”).
84. See id. at 593.
85. See id. at 597 (“[W]e cannot accept the parallel relied upon by petitioners and the
United States between the facts of Marsh and the case now before us. Our decisions . . .
require us to distinguish the public school context.”).
86. Id. at 599. Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence emphasized that while coercion is
sufficient for finding an Establishment Clause violation, it is not necessary. See id. at 604
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 632–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court was largely divided along
ideological lines. See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 1111.
88. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632–35.
89. See id. at 636 (“The Court’s argument that state officials have ‘coerced’ students to
take part in the invocation and benediction at graduation ceremonies is, not to put too fine a
point on it, incoherent.”).
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government prayer, the analytical difference was attributable to the legal
coercion for students to attend school or participate in school instruction, not
the age of the students.90 He asserted that school graduation was not a
curricular activity and that these students were not susceptible to the same
type of coercive pressures at graduation that are present in teacher
instruction.91 He noted that compulsory attendance created legitimate
psychological coercion and that compulsory attendance, which was not
present in the graduation setting, was a necessary component of a violation.92
Second, Justice Scalia articulated that sitting in silence during an invocation
could not be equated with joining in prayer, and even if there were pressure
to stand, it would not amount to religious participation.93
Despite Justice Scalia’s lamenting, eight years later, the Supreme Court
doubled down on its reasoning from Lee.94 In 2000, in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe,95 the Court found that a high school policy permitting
students to vote on whether to have students lead invocations prior to football
games and to determine who the spokesperson should be was
unconstitutional.96 The principal issue in Santa Fe was whether the student
messages qualified as private speech or state speech.97 Despite the fact that
students, rather than school officials or clergymen, were delivering prayers,
the Court found that because the invocations were authorized by school
policy, were presented at school-sponsored events, and were subject to
particular content regulations, the messages were government speech.98 The
Court affirmed that a majority election of the student speaker did not protect
minority views and could further intensify the potential for offense.99
In assessing the Establishment Clause violation, the Court first considered
the perceived and actual endorsement of religion by the school.100 Echoing
90. See id. at 643 (“Engel’s suggestion that the school prayer program at issue there—
which permitted students ‘to remain silent or be excused from the room’—involved ‘indirect
coercive pressure,’ should be understood against this backdrop of legal coercion.” (quoting
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962))).
91. See id.
92. See id.; see also Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT.
REV. 123, 129.
93. Lee, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See Michael McConnell & Marci A. Hamilton, Common Interpretation: The
Establishment Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/amendment-i/interps/264 [https://perma.cc/45CS-Z6RN] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022).
95. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
96. See id. at 298, 317.
97. See id. at 302.
98. See id. at 304; see also id. at 310 (“The delivery . . . over the school’s public address
system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty,
and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not
properly characterized as ‘private’ speech.”). The Court dismissed a claim that the school had
opened a limited public forum: the statement’s content was regulated, and only two students
had access to the platform to deliver the invocation, which had to be deemed appropriate under
the school district’s policy. See id. at 304; infra note 139 and accompanying text.
99. See id. at 304–05.
100. See id. at 305.
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Lee, the majority found that the degree of school involvement in the student
election demonstrated that the prayers were attributable to the school as state
action.101 The majority also noted that the school endorsed the message
because it was broadcast over the school’s audio system to a large audience
at the game, where players and students in the stands donned the school’s
name and mascot.102 Because these actions were attributable to the State, the
school was not insulated from the coercive effect of the final message.103
The Court found that the policy’s text asking for an “invocation” to
“solemnize the event” was religious and lacked an overriding secular
purpose.104 Ultimately, the Court found that the school violated Lemon’s
first prong because its primary purpose in creating the policy was not
secular.105
The majority additionally evaluated the coercive quality of the prayers.106
The Court dismissed the school’s argument that, regardless of the election,
there was no pressure to attend the football games in the same way that there
was to attend the graduation in Lee.107 Although students attend by their own
volition, the Court reasoned that peer pressure to attend high school football
games equivalently coerced students to participate in religious worship.108
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
dissented from the majority’s finding in Santa Fe that the student prayers
were state speech.109 The dissent stressed that the students’ control over the
content of the speech rendered it private.110 Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that the prayer before the football game was student-initiated and
could not implicate the endorsement test.111 While private student speech
may endorse religion, only government speech may create an Establishment
Clause violation.112 This divide marked the last time that the Supreme Court
assessed prayer in public schools.
Even with robust school prayer jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
grappled with finding a cohesive standard to assess Establishment Clause
violations.113 As demonstrated above, the various tests have sparked debate
101. See id.
102. See id. at 308.
103. See id. at 310; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87, 644 (1992); County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627–28, 668 (1989).
104. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.
105. See id. at 309.
106. See id. at 310.
107. See id. at 311.
108. See id. at 312 (“For many others, however, the choice between attending these games
and avoiding personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one.”).
109. See id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 324.
111. See id.
112. See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
113. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 610 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Thus, to the extent coercion is relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, it
is actual legal coercion that counts—not the ‘subtle coercive pressures’ allegedly felt by
respondents in this case . . . .” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992))); Santa
Fe, 530 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Valerie Strauss, The Truth About
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and incited controversy among the presiding justices,114 partially due to the
different types of cases that have circulated through the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Psychological coercion served as a
critical factor in cases involving state sponsorship of prayer, as demonstrated
above in Engel, Schempp, Lee, and Santa Fe.115 The secular purpose prong
of the Lemon test was critical in Jaffree and Santa Fe to the assessment of
the constitutionality of the school’s written policy and the state’s
legislation.116 The endorsement test proved pivotal in cases involving
religious symbols, though its existence as a modified Lemon standard gave
life to its use in Santa Fe.117 These various standards—of coercion,
endorsement, and elements of Lemon—overlap and have been used
interchangeably by circuit courts in cases involving public school prayer and
speech.118
2. Public School Prayer and the Free Exercise Clause
The Establishment Clause faces additional challenges when balanced
against its sister clause,119 the Free Exercise Clause, which protects the
exercise of religion from government interference.120 From 1963 until 1990,
the Supreme Court held that when a neutral and generally applicable law
jeopardizes a citizen’s ability to adhere to her religious beliefs, the Free
Exercise Clause compels the government to grant exemptions to
accommodate the citizen, unless the government can demonstrate a narrowly
tailored compelling interest.121 Then, in 1990, the Court repudiated its
exemption jurisprudence and held in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith122 that the right to freely exercise
religion does not relieve an individual from complying with valid neutral and
generally applicable laws, even if those laws are contrary to that individual’s

School Prayer, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answersheet/post/the-truth-about-school-prayer/2011/12/23/gIQAHHJoEP_blog.html
[https://perma.cc/62J5-R974].
114. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately,
however, the Court has replaced Lemon with its psycho-coercion test, which suffers the double
disability of having no roots whatever in our people’s historic practice, and being as infinitely
expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself.”).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51, 83–86, 106–08.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 103–05.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62, 67, 103.
118. See Schneider, supra note 56, at 948–52; see also infra Part II.B.3.
119. See Sherry, supra note 92, at 125.
120. See id. at 129.
121. See id. at 125 (first citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); then citing Thomas
v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); and then citing Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987)); see also Michael A. Helfand,
Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88
S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 557–58 (2015) (“[B]oth the Sherbet [sic] and Yoder courts afforded broad
protection to religiously motivated conduct against the substantial burdens imposed by
otherwise valid laws . . . .”).
122. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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religious practice, so long as the laws do not violate other constitutional
protections.123
In the free exercise cases following Smith, the Court clarified that the
government may not impose regulations or engage in practices that
demonstrate hostility toward religion.124 The Free Exercise Clause bars even
“subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion.125 When
evaluating whether the government action targets religion, the Court has
considered factors such as historical background, events leading to the action
or policy, and statements made by state officials.126
The implication of school prayer cases on accommodating the free
exercise of religion has not garnered much judicial action in the Supreme
Court.127 The Court in Lee lightly discussed this balance, proclaiming that
the governmental accommodation of free exercise “does not supersede
fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”128 The
Court noted that the Free Exercise Clause “embraces a freedom of conscience
and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First
Amendment.”129 Demonstrating this idea in Santa Fe, where the Court
interchangeably considered student prayer to be both government speech and
state-directed religious exercise, the Court demonstrated that an
Establishment Clause violation can occasionally serve to override both
claims.130
Although the precise constitutional balance between accommodating
religious exercise and preventing the establishment of religion remains
somewhat unsettled,131 the intersection between free speech and the
Establishment Clause in schools has been subject to thorough Supreme Court
review.
B. Free Speech in Public Schools
The First Amendment forbids the government from curtailing the freedom
of speech.132 The Supreme Court has long held that students and teachers do
123. See id. at 888–90. Justice Scalia elucidated a hybrid rights theory, which would
warrant strict scrutiny review when government action infringes on an individual’s free
exercise rights along with other constitutional rights, including free speech. See id. at 882–83.
124. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993).
125. Id. at 534; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1731 (2018).
126. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
127. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“We can decide the case without
reconsidering the general constitutional framework by which public schools’ efforts to
accommodate religion are measured.”).
128. Id. at 587.
129. Id. at 591.
130. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 299, 301, 307 n.21 (2000).
131. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. indicated in a plurality opinion that a religion-only
benefit is an Establishment Clause violation but that accommodating religion by lifting a
burden on free exercise does not typically violate the Establishment Clause. See Tex. Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989).
132. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”133 While free and open debate is necessary to the
functioning of our constitutional system,134 religious speech in public
schools reveals a tension between protecting free speech and preventing the
establishment of religion.135 The Supreme Court has ruled that religious
speech and nonreligious speech in schools enjoy equal First Amendment
protection and has found free speech violations when schools treat religious
speech as subordinate to nonreligious speech.136 However, a valid
Establishment Clause violation can serve to override free speech rights;
determining whether allocating funds to religious groups, providing space for
religious activity, or endorsing religious speech can amount to an
Establishment Clause violation at school requires a case-by-case factual
analysis.137
For the government to justify prohibiting speech or expression at
school,138 the school must show that its exclusionary action was caused “by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the innate discomfort that
accompanies an unpopular viewpoint.”139 Because schools contribute to the
“marketplace of ideas,” the Supreme Court has recognized that public college
campuses and high schools share many characteristics with a public forum
or a limited public forum.140 The Court has therefore held that denying
students or adult citizens141 their First Amendment free speech rights must
withstand the appropriate level of scrutiny.142
When schools create a forum that is generally open for use by student
groups but that excludes speech on the basis of religious content, the schools’
actions must withstand strict scrutiny review through the school’s
133. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
134. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, Inculcating Suppression, 107 GEO. L.J. 365,
371 (2019).
135. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 291, 263–64 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 234–35 (majority opinion); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
533 U.S. 98, 110 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841
(1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1980).
137. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“Our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence remains a delicate and fact-sensitive one.”); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
138. The Court recently held that schools could additionally apply some restrictions to
student speech made off campus. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2045
(2021) (“The school’s regulatory interests remain significant in some off-campus
circumstances.”).
139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). See
generally Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981–85 (2011)
(explaining that a public forum is “public property which the state has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity” and a limited public forum is “‘created’ by the
government, but only ‘for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, . . . or for discussion
of certain subjects’” (alteration in original) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educ.
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 46 n.7 (1983))).
140. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
141. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394–
95 (1993) (holding that a church enjoyed free speech rights when using public school facilities
after hours to screen a parenting video without running afoul of the Establishment Clause).
142. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268.
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demonstration of a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored to
achieve that end.143 In Widmar v. Vincent,144 members of a religious group
at a public university challenged a school policy that excluded religious
groups from using the university’s facilities for group meetings.145 The
Court held that the school policy discriminated against religious speech.146
The majority found that the school’s stated compelling governmental interest
in maintaining the strict separation of church and state was insufficient to
justify this content-based speech discrimination because allowing equal
access to school facilities would not violate the Establishment Clause.147 The
Court held that while it was highly possible that religion could benefit from
an open-forum policy, the religious group would only enjoy “incidental”
benefits, a result that does not run up against Lemon’s second prong
prohibiting the “primary advancement” of religion.148 An open forum in a
public university does not equate with state approval of religious practices,
the Court maintained, and the forum was available to both nonreligious and
religious speakers alike.149
The Court applied similar reasoning to religious speech and associational
rights in public secondary schools. In Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens,150 a public high school denied a student’s
request to form a Christian club that would enjoy the same privileges as other
student groups, such as meeting on premises during after-school hours.151
Students and parents sued the school, alleging that district authorities
violated the Equal Access Act.152 The Court held that denying official
recognition of the Christian club and equal access to the school’s limited
public forum, including the school newspaper and public address system,
amounted to content-based discrimination, contravening the Equal Access
Act.153
While the Court reached a consensus that the school violated the Equal
Access Act, the Court did not take a similar position regarding the question
of whether the Act violated the Establishment Clause.154 Applying the
reasoning from Widmar, Justice O’Connor, delivering the Court’s plurality
opinion, concluded that the Equal Access Act’s open-forum policy had a
143. See id. at 270.
144. 454 U.S. 263 (1980).
145. See id. at 270.
146. See id. at 271.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 275–76.
149. See id. at 277.
150. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
151. See id. at 232–33.
152. See 496 U.S. at 233. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074, forbids
federally funded public high schools from denying equal access to students who want to
conduct a meeting within a school’s limited public forum, based on the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech. 20 U.S.C. § 4071. It found that a limited open
forum in schools exists whenever a school allowed at least one extracurricular group to meet
on school premises during noninstructional time. See id.
153. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246–47.
154. See id. at 247.
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secular purpose and avoided entanglement with religion.155 Despite the high
school’s argument that an objective observer would perceive the Christian
club as showing official school support for religion,156 Justice O’Connor
noted that “secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.”157 As such, the plurality
reasoned that secondary school students are capable of distinguishing
between a state policy allowing student-initiated religion and school
sponsorship of religion and thus concluded that the risk of endorsement was
unfounded.158 Further, while the plurality conceded that there could be
student peer pressure, Justice O’Connor noted that the risk of endorsement
or coercion for students to engage in religious practice, without a formal
classroom setting, was unfounded.159
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but opined that the coercion
test should be used in place of the endorsement test, concluding that coercion
was not present.160 Justice Thurgood Marshall also concurred in the
judgment but conversely cautioned that the Equal Access Act could trigger
serious Establishment Clause concerns because the secondary school
presented a different forum than the public university did in Widmar.161
However, Justice Marshall was careful to note that this difference did not lie
in the fact that high school students may be less capable of perceiving
endorsement; rather, “the school’s behavior, not the purported immaturity of
high school students, [was] dispositive.”162 To address this concern, Justice
Marshall advocated for the school to affirmatively disclaim any endorsement
of the Christian club or clarify that clubs are not instrumental to the school’s
overall mission.163
Additionally, when outside religious groups use school facilities after
school hours, the Supreme Court has granted free speech protection.164 The
Court has cautioned that denying access to public school spaces due to
religious viewpoints on otherwise permissible subjects violates the Free
Exercise Clause. Further, the Court has stressed that outside, nonstudent
155. See id. at 248–49. The Supreme Court stated that permitting a religious group to meet
pursuant to the Equal Access Act would avoid entanglement because greater entanglement
would occur if the school had to enforce the exclusion of religious worship or speech. See id.
at 248–53.
156. See id. at 249. The high school was concerned that compulsory attendance at school
and the age of students would advance religion. The school argued that officially recognizing
a Christian club would effectively incorporate religion into the school’s official platform and
endorse participation in the club. See id. at 247–49.
157. Id. at 250.
158. See id. at 250–51.
159. Id. at 251.
160. See id. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that “the line between
voluntary and coerced participation may be difficult to draw.” Id. at 261–62.
161. See id. at 264–65 (Marshall, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 267.
163. See id. at 270.
164. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–
94 (1993).
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groups’ use of facilities after the school day does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.165
Five years later, the Court extended its public spaces rationale to school
funding in the seminal case Rosenberger v. Rector166 and held that a public
university’s denial of funding to a Christian magazine due to the content of
the magazine imposed a financial burden on free speech and amounted to
viewpoint discrimination.167 The Court held that even when the school
creates its own limited public forum, it must respect the lawful boundaries
that the forum has set.168 Thus, viewpoint discrimination is presumptively
impermissible when committed against speech that otherwise falls within the
limits of the forum.169 While the university argued that it had discriminated
against the magazine based on its religious subject matter, the Court found
that the “[u]niversity [did] not exclude religion as a subject matter but
select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with
religious editorial viewpoints.”170 The majority also affirmed that no
Establishment Clause violation existed because the funding program was
neutral toward religion and did not foster any mistaken impression that the
student club spoke for the university.171
These First Amendment cases demonstrate that when the government sets
up a forum for speech, whether it physically provides a space or funds a
program, it may not discriminate based on viewpoint. All the preceding cases
deem the exclusion of religious speakers to amount to viewpoint
discrimination. Further, these cases found that no Establishment Clause
violation resulted from including religious speakers because the government
was not endorsing any one specific speech within the forum. Whether those
same principles extend to religious speech by teachers in school is examined
further in Part II.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEE SPEECH AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Part II focuses on how courts have grappled with the question of whether
teachers, coaches, and other public secondary school employees are entitled
to pray in view of students at school. Part II.A will introduce Kennedy v.
Bremerton School District, a case involving a high school football coach who
was fired after praying at the fifty-yard line after home games. Part II.B will
assess the free speech rights of public school employees. It will explore how
165. See id. at 394–95; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114–
15 (2001).
166. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
167. See id. at 831.
168. See id. at 829–30.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 831. The Court acknowledged that the line between viewpoint and subject
matter discrimination can be difficult to draw but rebutted the dissent’s assertion that because
the school had discriminated against an entire class of viewpoints, no viewpoint discrimination
occurred. See id. at 831–32. The majority noted that the debate in a marketplace of ideas is
still skewed if multiple voices are silenced. See id.
171. Id. at 838–42.
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Garcetti v. Ceballos,172 which held that public employees do not speak as
citizens for First Amendment purposes when making statements pursuant to
their official duties, applies to teachers and coaches. Part II.C will address
how circuit courts have used a potential Establishment Clause violation to
override a school employee’s free speech rights when assuming that the
speech is protected.
A. Introduction to Kennedy v. Bremerton School District
The Supreme Court has yet to consider a case in which a public school
employee has engaged in self-initiated prayer at school; even in circuit
courts, there is a dearth of such decisions.173 The few cases that have arisen
have generally resulted in schools succeeding in their claims that disciplining
public employees for engaging in prayer in the school setting or prohibiting
government prayer altogether is constitutionally permissible.174
A case from the Ninth Circuit, which the Supreme Court will hear on April
25, 2022, examines the issue at hand.175 In Kennedy v. Bremerton School
District, a high school football coach, Joseph Kennedy, brought a First
Amendment suit176 against his school district for suspending him after he
engaged in prayer after football games.177
Beginning in 2008, Kennedy kneeled and prayed aloud at the fifty-yard
line immediately following games.178 Over the course of seven years,
players increasingly joined as he delivered audible prayers.179 As more
players gathered around Kennedy, he began to also deliver motivational
speeches with religious messages and occasionally engaged in pregame
prayers in the locker room.180 The school district had not received
complaints from players or parents, but in 2015, a school district official
expressed disapproval to Kennedy, and the superintendent sent Kennedy a
letter detailing the school policy that “school staff shall neither encourage or
discourage a student from engaging in . . . prayer.”181 After receiving the
letter, Kennedy stopped conducting pregame prayers in the locker room and
leading motivational religious speeches but continued to pray on the field

172. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
173. See Russo & Osborne, supra note 7, at 403.
174. See infra Part II.C.
175. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(mem.); No. 21-418, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/
public/21-418.html [https://perma.cc/Z4F5-CDUP] (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
176. Kennedy also brought a Title VII claim, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
177. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. (Kennedy I), 869 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (mem.).
178. See id. at 816.
179. See id.; see also Brett A. Geier & Ann E. Blankenship, Praying for Touchdowns:
Contemporary Law and Legislation for Prayer in Public School Athletics, 15 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 381, 415 (2017).
180. This practice—of players themselves praying in the locker room before games—
predated Kennedy’s tenure at the school. Kennedy I, 869 F.3d at 816–18.
181. Id. at 817.
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immediately following games.182 After back-and-forth correspondence
between Kennedy and the district, the district delivered a new policy that
prohibited public employees from engaging in “demonstrative religious
activity . . . readily observable to (if not intended to be observed by) students
and the attending public.”183 Kennedy refused to stop praying at the
fifty-yard line, and the district suspended him.184 There was substantial
media attention surrounding Kennedy’s initial discipline, follow-up letters,
and suspension.185
In 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kennedy’s
motion for a preliminary injunction and held that Kennedy could not
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment
claim.186 Kennedy petitioned the Supreme Court to review his case in 2019,
but the Court denied certiorari.187 However, Justice Alito wrote a concurring
six-page statement, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
expressing his opinion that the Ninth Circuit’s “understanding of the free
speech rights of public school teachers is troubling.”188 On remand, the
district court resolved a previous factual dispute regarding Kennedy’s
dismissal and confirmed that he had been suspended due to his prayers at the
fifty-yard line.189 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court’s
decision and denying a petition for rehearing en banc, doubled down on its
original reasoning.190 Instead of heeding Justice Alito’s opinion, the Ninth
Circuit held that Kennedy’s prayer was not protected speech under the First
Amendment.191 As the case awaits review by the Supreme Court, the dispute
over whether Kennedy’s prayer is entitled to First Amendment protection
remains unresolved.192
B. Public School Employees’ Right to Free Speech
While the Ninth Circuit’s conception of schoolteachers’ rights may indeed
be “troubling,” the issue of teacher prayer in schools admittedly merges three
abstruse clauses of the First Amendment. First, teachers are government
employees and consequently do not enjoy absolute free speech rights for
182. See id.
183. Id. at 819.
184. See id. at 819–20.
185. See id. at 818; Jason Hanna & Steve Almasy, Washington High School Football
Coach Placed on Leave for Praying at the Field, CNN (Oct. 30, 2015, 7:16 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/29/us/washington-football-coach-joe-kennedy-prays/
index.html [https://perma.cc/9S4C-YY68].
186. See Kennedy I, 869 F.3d at 831.
187. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. (Kennedy II), 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (statement of
Alito, J.).
188. Id. at 4.
189. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231 (W.D. Wash. 2020),
aff’d, 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 4 F.4th 910 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (mem.),
cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.).
190. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 4 F.4th 910 (9th Cir. 2021) (en
banc) (mem.), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.).
191. See id. at 1015.
192. Id. at 1010.
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speech they engage in pursuant to their job.193 Second, prayer, as religious
speech, implicates free exercise concerns.194 Finally, the presence of
students “differentiates the education context from the broader sphere of
public employment,”195 in part due to heightened Establishment Clause
concerns. Qualifying whether a teacher’s speech is private or attributable to
their government employer is vital196 because the Establishment Clause
places limitations on government speech that “establishes a religion . . . or
tends to do so.”197
Part II.B.1. will introduce the reduced First Amendment rights that
government employees retain at work under Garcetti v. Ceballos. Part II.B.2
will discuss whether, and Part II.B.3 will discuss to what extent, public
school teachers and coaches retain First Amendment free speech rights
during the school day, in part by exploring the landscape of lower court
opinions.
1. Abridged Free Speech Rights for Government Employees
The Supreme Court has held that citizens must accept certain limitations
to their rights when undertaking government employment.198 Public
employers are entitled to a certain level of control over their employees’
actions to conduct efficient public service.199
Moreover, because
government employees “occupy trusted positions in society,” their speech is
capable of defying and undermining the government’s objective.200 Yet,
citizens who are government employees are nonetheless citizens,201 and they
are entitled to First Amendment liberties in their capacity as such.202
193. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See generally Amanda Harmon
Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: The Increasing Constriction of Constitutional
Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235, 264–66 (2014).
194. As demonstrated in Part I, however, courts more often consider prayer as implicating
free speech rights rather than free exercise rights. See supra Part I.A.2.
195. Recent Case, Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010),
124 HARV. L. REV. 2107, 2111 (2011).
196. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 321 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); see also Abner S. Greene, The
Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 337, 350 (2016)
(“[A]rguably the state has an interest—pursuant to what we might call Establishment Clause
values rather than an Establishment Clause rule—in avoiding possible association with or
advancement of religious doctrine.”); Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
833, 835, 839 (2010); Caroline Mala Corbin, Government Employee Religion, 49 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1193, 1207 (2017); supra Part I.A.
197. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
198. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994).
199. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006); see also Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
200. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419.
201. See id.
202. See id. (“The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the
employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy
in their capacities as private citizens.”); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972).
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In 1968, the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education203 that teachers
do not relinquish their free speech rights when they comment on matters of
public interest.204 In Pickering, a public school teacher was fired after
writing a letter to her local newspaper criticizing her board of education’s tax
proposals.205 The Court was tasked with deciding whether the First
Amendment protected her right to write the letter.206 The Court created a
balancing test to determine whether public employees can assert the same
First Amendment rights afforded to private citizens.207 In applying this test,
the Court found that school funding was a matter of legitimate public interest,
such that teachers, who are especially informed on the matter, should be able
to speak freely on the matter without fear of retaliation.208 The Court
balanced this right against the interest of the state as an employer.209 The
Court concluded that the school board’s interest in limiting a teacher’s
opportunity to contribute to public discourse is not significantly greater than
its interest in limiting a similar contribution from a member of the general
public; therefore, the school’s actions were unconstitutional.210 This inquiry,
balancing the rights of the employee with the interests of the government,
has been dubbed the “Pickering balancing test.”211
In Connick v. Myers,212 the Court held that a public employee must be
speaking on matters of public concern for their speech to warrant First
Amendment protection.213 Matters of public concern fairly relate to issues
“of political, social, or other concern to the community.”214 Together, the
Court’s decisions in Connick and Pickering created a two-pronged inquiry to
assess whether public employees have speech rights.215 First, the Court must
determine that public employees are speaking as citizens on a matter of
public concern for their speech to warrant First Amendment protection.216 If
so, the Court then proceeds to the second prong—the Pickering balancing
test—to determine whether the employer’s interest in disciplining the speech
outweighs the speech rights of that employee.217
In 2006, the Supreme Court transformed the first prong from whether the
employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, to whether
203. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
204. See id. at 568, 574; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 143 (1983).
205. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565–66.
206. See id. at 568.
207. See Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free
Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L.
REV. 133, 139 (2008).
208. See id. at 572.
209. See Oluwole, supra note 207, at 139.
210. See id.
211. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 445 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
213. See id. at 146.
214. Id.
215. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143–44.
216. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
217. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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the employee is not speaking pursuant to official job duties on a matter of
public concern. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,218 the Court considered whether a
district attorney’s written memo concerning governmental misconduct was
protected speech under the First Amendment.219 The Court, using the
Pickering balancing test, found that when an employee’s speech is made
pursuant to official responsibilities, the First Amendment does not prohibit
disciplinary repercussions.220 The majority concluded that in this setting,
public employees are not speaking as private citizens for First Amendment
purposes, regardless of whether that speech discusses a matter of public
concern.221 The Court noted that the lower court relied solely on whether the
memo involved a matter of public concern and failed to consider whether the
district attorney was speaking as a citizen when he wrote the memo.222
The Court in Garcetti acknowledged two important points. First, because
both parties in the case stipulated that Ceballos was writing the memo
pursuant to his employment duties, the Court did not articulate an analytical
framework for determining how courts should decide what type of conduct
falls within the scope of employment duties.223 The Court only specified that
government employers could not create overly broad responsibilities to
blanket all conduct that could arise on the job.224 Second, the majority, in
response to Justice David Souter’s dissent, noted that this decision may not
apply in the same manner to cases involving scholarship or teaching because
faculty and institutions have unique academic freedom.225
The Court has since clarified that “the critical question under Garcetti is
whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”226 While
the Court has not specified whether teachers in secondary schools are subject
to the Garcetti framework for all speech they make at school, the Court has
affirmed that “teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate.”227 Whether faculty and similar school employees are

218. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
219. See id. at 413–15.
220. See id. at 424.
221. See id. at 421.
222. Id. at 416 (“The Court of Appeals determined that Ceballos’ memo, which recited
what he thought to be governmental misconduct, was ‘inherently a matter of public concern.’
The court did not, however, consider whether the speech was made in Ceballos’ capacity as a
citizen.” (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (2004))).
223. See id. at 425; see also Stone T. Hendrickson, Note, Salvaging Garcetti: How a
Procedural Change Could Save Public-Employee Speech, 71 ALA. L. REV. 291, 303 (2019).
224. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
225. See id. at 425. Justice David Souter recognized that the majority’s decision could
“imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities,
whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’” Id. at 438
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 392 (2003)). Academic
freedom protects an individual’s scholarship, research, and instruction from interference by
the school institution. See, e.g., William W. Pendleton, The Freedom to Teach, in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: AN EVERYDAY CONCERN 11, 11–12 (Ernst Benjamin et al. eds., 1994).
226. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).
227. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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entitled to free speech protections during the school day remains
undecided.228 The next section discusses the circuit courts’ application of
Garcetti to public school employees.
2. Garcetti’s Application to Public School Employees
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has not yet revisited Garcetti’s
application to speech by public school employees.229 The Court’s statement
in Garcetti that “expression related to . . . classroom instruction implicates
additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this
Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence”230 has sparked
disagreement among circuit courts over how to assess employee speech
rights in secondary schools.231
While most circuits have held that Garcetti’s inquiry remains the threshold
question for whether public secondary school employees may bring a
retaliatory First Amendment claim,232 the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
have not extended Garcetti’s prong to public secondary school teachers,
noting the Supreme Court’s unresolved statement regarding the case’s
application to classroom instruction.233 These courts instead engaged in a
Pickering balancing test, applied their own precedent to determine whether
that speech is protected by the First Amendment, or dismissed the claims on
other grounds entirely.234 These circuits, however, have used an inquiry
similar to Garcetti’s while declining to apply it, asking whether teacher

228. Pat Fackrell, Note, Demers v. Austin: The Ninth Circuit Resolves the Public
Employee Speech Doctrine’s Uncertain Application to Academic Speech, 51 IDAHO L. REV.
513, 521–522 (2015).
229. See Forster, supra note 17, at 696.
230. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006). The Court further stated that “we need
not . . . decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a
case involving speech related to . . . teaching.” Id.
231. See Strasser, supra note 24, at 595.
232. See, e.g., Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2016); Mpoy v.
Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 289–90 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332,
340–41 (6th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 342 F. App’x 223, 224
(8th Cir. 2009); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2007); Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007);
Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App’x 885, 886 (11th Cir. 2006); Cooley,
supra note 193, at 265.
233. See Lee-Walker v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 712 F. App’x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“Because we decide the claims against the individual defendants on the basis of qualified
immunity, we need not reach the issue of whether Garcetti in fact applies to speech made by
educators as a constitutional matter.”); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153,
171 n.13 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Court expressly stated that it left the determination of whether
this analysis would apply in the educational context for another day. . . . [But] [i]f Garcetti
applied . . . , Borden’s speech would not be protected . . . .”); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484
F.3d 687, 695 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Court explicitly did not decide whether this analysis
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to teaching. Thus, we
continue to apply the Pickering-Connick standard . . . .” (citations omitted)).
234. See Lee-Walker, 712 F. App’x at 45; Borden, 523 F.3d at 171 n.13; York, 484 F.3d at
695 n.11.
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speech was made pursuant to official duties or was otherwise made on the
job.235
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits applied Garcetti but dismissed the
academic freedom argument that the majority excerpted and that Justice
Souter promulgated, finding that the “concept . . . does not readily apply to
in-class curricular speech at the high school level.”236 These circuits held
that secondary school teacher speech is subject to the Garcetti framework
because the Supreme Court had not intended to protect high school
employees.237 These two circuits found that teacher curricular speech,
especially in the high school classroom, was not entitled to First Amendment
protection because a teacher’s primary duty is to instruct students.238 This
rejection of the academic freedom argument has been met with criticism.239
Outside the classroom setting, the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits have found that Garcetti is also the appropriate threshold standard
to determine whether public school employees were speaking pursuant to
their duties.240 In these cases, public school employees engaged in
noncurricular correspondence with their employers, where, for example, they
expressed disapproval with a certain policy or practice employed by their
school district and were subsequently disciplined.241 Though the Court in
Garcetti notedly refused to “articulate a comprehensive framework for
defining the scope of an employee’s duties . . . where there is . . . serious . . .
debate,”242 these circuits were at times tasked with doing just that.243
The dispute that remained for the Ninth Circuit’s consideration in
Kennedy, then, was first whether Garcetti applies to speech made by
secondary school employees while on the job.244 The Ninth Circuit, in
statements from its order denying a petition for rehearing en banc, fiercely
debated Garcetti’s warning that government employers may not restrict free

235. See York, 484 F.3d at 695, 697.
236. Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 343; see Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474
F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
237. See Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 343–44; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480; Recent Case, supra
note 195, at 2109–10.
238. See Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 340–41; Lee, 484 F.3d at 687, 694 n.11.
239. Recent Case, supra note 195, at 2114.
240. See generally Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Douglas
Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 342 F. App’x 223 (8th Cir. 2009); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks
Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d
689 (5th Cir. 2007); Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App’x 885 (11th Cir.
2006).
241. These cases did not involve speech made in front of, or to, students. See generally
Mpoy, 758 F.3d 285; Anderson, 342 F. App’x 223; Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d 1192;
Williams, 480 F.3d 689; Gilder-Lucas, 186 F. App’x 885.
242. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
243. See generally Mpoy, 758 F.3d 285; Anderson, 342 F. App’x 223; Brammer-Hoelter,
492 F.3d 1192; Williams, 480 F.3d 689; Gilder-Lucas, 186 F. App’x 885; see also Johnson v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
244. See Kennedy I, 869 F.3d 813, 827 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019)
(mem.).
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speech rights by “creating excessively broad job descriptions.”245 The court
ultimately held that Kennedy spoke as a public employee rather than as a
private citizen.246 Invoking Garcetti and the circuit’s own First Amendment
precedent,247 the court found that Kennedy’s prayers were made pursuant to
his job duties, which entailed both serving as a role model and teaching.248
3. Which Speech Activities Qualify as “On the Job”?
To determine whether public school employees are speaking as private
citizens or public officials, it is critical to assess the scope of their
employment duties at school.249 Because both parties in Garcetti stipulated
that writing memos was one of the district attorney’s official duties, the
Supreme Court explicitly noted that it would not speculate on or create a
framework for courts to use to determine what speech falls within official
duties.250 The Court, however, emphasized that assessing which tasks fall
within the scope of official duties is a practical inquiry.251 The majority
noted that a formal list of employment responsibilities would not be
necessary or sufficient to show that a type of speech is within the scope of
that employee’s duties under the First Amendment.252
A public school teacher and coach’s duties can be broad and multifaceted.
In circumstances where secondary school employees have spoken out in
nonclassroom settings, out of eyesight or earshot of students, circuits have
diverged over whether certain noncurricular speech is nonetheless made
pursuant to employment duties.253 For example, the Fifth Circuit held that
an athletic director, who was fired after sending a memo that questioned
funding allocations within the school, was speaking in the course of his
employment and thus was not protected by the First Amendment.254 The
Eleventh Circuit similarly applied Garcetti in rejecting a school employee’s
245. See id. at 823 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.
(Kennedy IV), 4 F.4th 910, 915–20 (9th Cir. 2021) (Smith, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc).
246. See Kennedy I, 869 F.3d at 827. Whether Garcetti should apply to secondary public
school employees on principles of academic freedom is beyond the scope of this Note.
247. The Ninth Circuit assesses First Amendment retaliation claims under Eng v. Cooley,
552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009), which clarified the Garcetti standard. Eng provides five factors
that a plaintiff must demonstrate to bring a successful claim: (1) the employee spoke on a
matter of public concern, (2) the employee spoke as a citizen instead of an employee, (3) the
speech was the motivating factor for the disciplinary employment action, (4) the State was
justified for treating the employee differently than other members of the public, and (5) the
State would have taken that action even if that speech was unprotected. Kennedy I, 869 F.3d
at 822 (citing Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070–72).
248. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021) (Christen, J., concurring), cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.); Kennedy II, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (statement of Alito,
J.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 857
(2022) (No. 21-418), 2021 WL 4220933, at *22–23.
249. See, e.g., Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1016 (majority opinion).
250. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
251. See id.
252. Id. at 425.
253. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007).
254. Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007).
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First Amendment speech claim when she was fired after inadequately filling
out her school district’s questionnaire as part of her job as a cheerleading
coach.255 The Tenth Circuit, however, found that teachers’ speech at board
meetings, while tangentially related to their employment, was not made
pursuant to their official duties as specified in Garcetti and therefore was
entitled to First Amendment protection.256 The Third Circuit similarly found
that a teacher’s out-of-class conduct, including advocating for a certain
teaching style, was protected but that her in-class speech was not.257
In the classroom, however, the majority of circuit courts have agreed that
teachers are not entitled to First Amendment protection for their speech.
Teachers and coaches have a unique role as compared to other government
employees because they are tasked with the responsibility of educating
students.258 In the classroom, circuit courts have found that a teacher’s
curricular speech is not private speech because teachers are hired for the
purpose of teaching curriculum to students.259 Courts have specified that
teachers are not protected under the First Amendment from retaliatory
dismissal for expressing a political viewpoint during class discussions or for
selecting unpopular materials for students to read.260 As Judge Jeffrey Sutton
of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, “[T]he essence of a teacher’s role is to prepare
students for their place in society as responsible citizens.”261
Whether that essence carries over outside the classroom remains at issue
in Kennedy.262 The Ninth Circuit has twice now found that Kennedy’s job
as a high school football coach “involved modeling good behavior while
acting in an official capacity in the presence of students and spectators.”263
The court held that when Kennedy took a knee and prayed immediately
following football games, he was still acting pursuant to his “responsibility
255. Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 186 F. App’x 885, 886 (11th Cir. 2006).
256. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203–04. The Tenth Circuit stated: “Although the
record indicates that Plaintiffs were encouraged to present their views to improve the [school]
and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the Board, we cannot deem such a
generalized grievance policy to be an official duty without eviscerating Garcetti.” Id. at 1204.
257. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
258. Geier & Blankenship-Knox, supra note 36, at 32 (“In addition to the duties associated
with training a team for athletic competition, coaches, like teachers, are hired to communicate
with players and spectators both verbally and demonstratively.”).
259. See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth
Circuit held that a teacher’s curricular speech delivered in the classroom, including the
selection of classroom materials, was made pursuant to the teacher’s official duties. See id.
The Seventh Circuit held in 2007 that a teacher was not entitled to First Amendment protection
for taking a political viewpoint in classroom instruction. See Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007). The majority noted that the teacher’s current
events lesson was part of the teacher’s assigned classroom duties and that Garcetti directly
applied. See id.
260. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
261. Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 339 (alteration in original) (quoting Hardy v. Jefferson
Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001)).
262. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct.
857 (2022) (No. 21-418), 2021 WL 4220933, at *1.
263. Kennedy I, 869 F.3d 813, 826 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019)
(mem.).
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to serve as a role model and moral exemplar.”264 Thus, the Court held that
Kennedy was acting pursuant to his duties as a coach when kneeling to
pray.265
Justice Alito and the dissenting Ninth Circuit judges objected to this broad
interpretation of Kennedy’s employment duties.266 They pointed out that
Garcetti warned against the idea that employers could restrict an employee’s
First Amendment rights by creating “excessively broad job descriptions.”267
Justice Alito stated that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
appears to regard teachers and coaches as being on duty at all times from
the moment they report for work to the moment they depart, provided that
they are within the eyesight of students. Under this interpretation of
Garcetti, if teachers are visible to a student while eating lunch, they can be
ordered not to engage in any “demonstrative” conduct of a religious nature,
such as folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer.268

The Ninth Circuit, when rehearing this case in 2021, rejected Justice
Alito’s assertion that their prior opinion would suggest that a teacher praying
before meals would constitute government employee speech.269 The court
distinguished the instant case from Garcetti by noting that Kennedy himself
acknowledged that he was a role model to his students.270 The dissenting
judges argued that the majority did not adequately lay out how to distinguish
between a coach serving as a role model on the field following games and a
teacher serving as a role model while sitting in the cafeteria.271 The dissent
urged that if Kennedy was considered to be on duty at all times at school, by
virtue of serving as a leader to his players, then teachers could never engage
in private expression, particularly private religious expression, at school.272
The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that Kennedy’s postgame prayer
was speech made pursuant to his job responsibilities.273 Though the court
determined that Kennedy did not speak as a private citizen when he delivered
prayers following games, the court still assessed whether the speech would
survive the Pickering balancing test if his prayer did indeed warrant First
Amendment protection.274 In Kennedy, the majority determined that the
264. Id.
265. Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (Smith, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc).
266. Kennedy II, 139 S. Ct. 634, 636 (2019) (statement of Alito, J.).
267. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
268. Kennedy II, 139 S. Ct. at 636 (statement of Alito, J.).
269. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(mem.).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1015–16; Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2021) (Smith, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing en banc).
272. See id. at 930 (O’Scannlain, J., statement regarding denial of rehearing en banc); see
also Larry D. Spurgeon, The Endangered Citizen Servant: Garcetti Versus the Public Interest
and Academic Freedom, 39 J. COLL. & U.L. 405, 433, 454 (2013).
273. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1023.
274. See id. at 1016–17. Both parties stipulated that Kennedy spoke on a matter of public
concern when he prayed, thereby rendering the first prong of Pickering satisfied. See
Kennedy I, 869 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (mem.). The
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school’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation outweighed
Kennedy’s interest in praying, even if that speech could be considered
private.275 This reasoning sparked debate among the Ninth Circuit judges
regarding when the Establishment Clause can serve to override a public
school employee’s First Amendment protection.276
C. The Establishment Clause and Overriding Public Employees’ First
Amendment Rights Under Pickering
As stated above, after finding that an employee’s speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection, courts conduct the Pickering balancing test to
determine whether the school’s interest outweighs the employee’s right.277
For religious speech in public schools, circuit courts have primarily
considered the countervailing governmental interest to be the potential
Establishment Clause violation. Most circuits that have conducted the
balancing test have found in favor of the public school.278
Circuit courts have been particularly diligent in precluding any type of
employee-directed religious exercise in the school setting, with many
reasoning that this conduct signifies the school’s endorsement of religion.
For example, in Warnock v. Archer,279 from the Eighth Circuit, an art teacher
brought an Establishment Clause claim against his school district for
requiring him to attend training meetings that included prayer.280 The
district’s superintendent conducted prayers at these required meetings, and
when the art teacher requested him to stop, he refused.281 The Eighth Circuit
held that the prayers could signify the school’s endorsement of religion and
that the Constitution forbids the government from “conveying the message
that it decisively endorses a particular religious position.”282 Because this
claim was brought by a teacher and not by a student, the court rejected the
psychological coercion argument, reasoning that an adult man would be
unlikely to succumb to religious indoctrination.283 Instead, the Court held
that the prayers at issue could not be considered private speech by the school

Ninth Circuit’s precedent had previously established that religious speech by teachers was
“unquestionably of inherent public concern.” Id. at 824 (citing Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Third Circuit has disagreed, holding that prayer
is not a matter of public concern and explaining that a coach’s prayer, including kneeling and
bowing his head, did not constitute a policy statement, did not shed light on school practices,
and did not expose unfavorable matters in which the school was engaged. See Borden v. Sch.
Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 170 (3d Cir. 2008).
275. Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th at 921 (Smith, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
276. See id. at 911–12.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 216–17; see, e.g., Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th at 921
(Smith, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
278. See infra text accompanying notes 281–97.
279. 380 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 2004).
280. Id. at 1079.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 1080.
283. See id. at 1080–81.
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official, as they were not sporadic and were conducted by the school official
leading the mandatory meeting.284
The Fifth and Third Circuits have also used the Establishment Clause to
justify overriding employees’ free speech rights.285
In Doe v.
Duncanville,286 a Fifth Circuit case from 1995, the court found that a high
school basketball coach’s initiation of and participation in prayers with
students was unconstitutional.287 There, a student sued her school district for
allowing coaches to initiate prayers at school games and practices.288 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the school district
from permitting employees to “lead, encourag[e], promot[e] or participat[e]
in prayers with or among students during curricular or extracurricular
activities.”289 The school district appealed the decision, arguing that a
prohibition on employee participation in religious prayer would violate their
free speech and free exercise rights.290 The Fifth Circuit nonetheless
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that public school employees
could neither participate in nor supervise student prayers before games.291
The court did not conduct the Pickering balancing test to assess the coach’s
free speech argument.292
The Fifth Circuit also categorically rejected the coach’s free exercise
claim, asserting that the Establishment Clause limits free exercise and free
speech rights.293 While the Fifth Circuit proclaimed that “modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is rife with confusion,” it laid out the
Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests to assess the school’s practices.294
As applied to employee participation in prayer, the court reasoned that
because the prayers took place during school-controlled activities that
members of the basketball team were required to attend, the prayers would
violate the endorsement test.295 Further, the court stated that the school

284. See id. at 1081.
285. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 161 (3d Cir. 2008); Doe v.
Duncanville, 70 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 1995).
286. 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
287. Id. at 404; Borden, 523 F.3d at 167. This case predated Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
288. Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 404. Notably, these facts are distinguishable from the facts in
Kennedy because a student brought an Establishment Clause claim, whereas Kennedy initially
asserted that his free speech and free exercise rights were violated. See Kennedy I, 869 F.3d
813, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (mem.).
289. Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 405.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 406.
293. See id. at 405–06. The Fifth Circuit did not conduct a thorough analysis of the
employees’ free exercise rights and instead pulled language from Lee, stating that “the
principle that the government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.” Id. (quoting Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992)).
294. See id. at 405; see supra Part I.A (discussing the various Establishment Clause tests
employed by the Supreme Court).
295. See Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406.
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representatives’ participation in religion was an improper entanglement with
religion under Lemon.296
In Borden v. School District of East Brunswick,297 the Third Circuit
assessed a school policy that allowed student-initiated prayer and prohibited
school representatives from joining in.298 A football coach challenged the
school’s policy as a violation of his free speech rights.299 The Third Circuit
found that the policy was constitutional and, further, that the coach’s acts of
bowing his head and taking a knee did not trigger his First Amendment
rights.300 The court then reasoned that the coach violated the Establishment
Clause when he joined his team as they prayed.301 The Third Circuit took a
restrictive approach for evaluating religious endorsement in the school
setting, finding that “[g]enerally, if a school official is engaging in student
prayer to the extent that they are leading it, initiating it, or requiring it, the
school official, and thus the school district, is violating the Establishment
Clause.”302
The court explicitly chose not to engage in a Lemon analysis or a coercion
analysis because it found that the coach’s behavior failed the endorsement
test.303 The Court engaged in extensive factual review to demonstrate that
the coach was heavily involved in the organization, planning, and leading of
pregame prayers for his team, including activities like selecting a chaplain
for pregame dinners.304 The Third Circuit did not, however, distinguish
between the coach endorsing religion and the school district endorsing
religion, despite the fact that the school district had asked him to discontinue
his prayer activities.305 The Third Circuit held that, as a school official, the
coach was not constitutionally permitted to endorse religion.306 The court
qualified this finding by stating that if a coach had never engaged in or
organized prayer for his team, but instead were to bow his head and take a
knee while the team prayed on its own accord, the conclusion would be much
less clear.307
In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit panel similarly found that, “[t]o answer [the]
question [of whether an Establishment Clause violation existed], [the court]
must examine whether a reasonable observer, aware of the history of
Kennedy’s religious activity, and his solicitation of community and national
support for his actions, would perceive [the school’s] allowance of

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See id.
523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008).
See id. at 159.
See id. at 158.
See id. at 171.
See id. at 161.
Id. at 166.
See id. at 175; see also Geier & Blankenship-Knox, supra note 179, at 413.
See Borden, 523 F.3d at 177.
See id. at 177–78.
See id.
See id. at 178.
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Kennedy’s conduct as an endorsement of religion.”308 The panel concluded
that regardless of whether Kennedy could assert a valid First Amendment
free speech claim, his prayer in front of students would implicate the
Establishment Clause because his prayer would have been construed as the
district’s endorsement of religion.309
However, in the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, the dissenting
judges stated that justifying discrimination against Kennedy by the potential
of an Establishment Clause violation was incorrect.310 Judge Diarmuid
O’Scannlain reasoned that the school could not have endorsed religion
because reasonable observers at Kennedy’s games were aware that the school
did not condone, much less endorse, his prayers.311 Other judges condemned
the endorsement test and argued that the majority’s conclusion erroneously
extended Supreme Court precedent.312
Because Kennedy worked as a public employee, Judge O’Scannlain
reasoned that the Establishment Clause’s limitations on state action should
not apply.313 First, Judge O’Scannlain argued that the school could not have
endorsed religion because the Ninth Circuit assumed arguendo that Kennedy
was speaking as a private citizen.314 As a private citizen, he maintained, it
would be impossible for Kennedy’s actions to constitute the endorsement of
religion since private speech would foreclose Santa Fe’s application to the
case at hand.315 He argued that the panel lacked a single Supreme Court case
that “supports its implicit assumption that a private individual can commit an
Establishment Clause violation.”316
Second, Judge O’Scannlain maintained that the case did not comprise the
same types of “institutional entanglements with religion—often described as
‘coercive’—which may give rise to an Establishment Clause violation.”317
The judge argued that the panel’s opinion was devoid of factors that logically
linked this case to the Supreme Court’s Lee and Santa Fe decisions, like “[a]
school policy, [a] degree of control over employee speech, neutrality toward
religion, or [a] possibility of coercion.”318 The judge reasoned that this
alleged Establishment Clause violation could not serve as the compelling
308. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(mem.).
309. See id. at 1011.
310. Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th 910, 945 (9th Cir. 2021) (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“The majority’s holding . . . signals that public employers who merely fail
to act with sufficient force to squelch an employee’s publicly observable religious activity
may be liable for such a claim.”).
311. Id. at 944; see also Joanne C. Brant, Engel: Divisiveness or Coercion—A Response
to Professor Marshall, 46 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 383 (2018) (“In any event, the district court
applied the endorsement test, and it produced a harsh and bitterly-resented outcome.”).
312. Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th at 945–46 (Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
313. See id. at 941 (O’Scannlain, J., statement regarding denial of rehearing en banc).
314. See id. at 941–42.
315. Id. at 941.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 940.
318. Id. at 941.
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state interest to justify restricting Kennedy’s private prayer.319 Judge Nelson,
also dissenting, stated, “Nothing here suggests coercion.”320 Judge Nelson
argued that the record did not demonstrate that student participation in the
prayer was mandatory or that Kennedy disfavored players who did not
participate.321 He reasoned that despite one player fearing mistreatment, the
“single statement from one player experiencing ‘subtle pressure’ is hardly
enough.”322
Finally, Judge O’Scannlain lamented the panel’s conclusion that the
district’s only option was to suspend Kennedy.323 He argued that the school
could have disclaimed Kennedy’s speech to dispel any mistaken inference of
endorsement.324 Essentially, he determined that under strict scrutiny review,
suspending Kennedy was not the least restrictive means the school could
have taken.325
III. CARVING OUT AN EXCEPTION FOR TEACHER PRAYER
If the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands, public school employees who pray
silently may not be entitled to First Amendment protection.326 This
conception of Garcetti runs up against core First Amendment principles.
Though teachers and coaches are entrusted with the role of molding
adolescents into productive citizens, this Note argues that the teacher’s job
does not include being a role model in every act of speech. Teachers speak
in a variety of ways in various settings throughout the school day; some of
that speech is instructional, but some of that speech is the teacher’s own
private speech. As such, this Note reasons that Garcetti should be interpreted
to permit public school employees to engage in private religious speech at
school. Affording these rights upholds vital free speech and free exercise
protections.
Part III.A argues that religious prayer is private speech and should not fall
within the scope of a teacher’s employment duties. Part III.B maintains,
however, that if a teacher’s or coach’s religious expression amounts to an
Establishment Clause violation, that teacher or coach may be justifiably
subject to discipline. This Note reasons that an Establishment Clause
violation arises if the employee’s speech psychologically coerces students to
engage in religious participation.327

319. See id. at 942.
320. Id. at 948 (Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 948. (“The Establishment Clause was designed to keep government out of
personal religious exercise, not purge religion from the public square.”).
323. Id. at 942 (O’Scannlain, J., statement regarding denial of rehearing en banc).
324. Id. at 942–43.
325. Id.
326. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
327. This Note admits that a school may violate the Establishment Clause by affirmatively
endorsing religion; however, simply allowing a public employee to continue praying would
not appear to a reasonable observer that the school is endorsing that employee’s religion.
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A. Limiting Garcetti’s Scope for Public School Employees
When employees speak as private citizens on matters of public concern,328
the Supreme Court stressed that it is critical to promote both individual and
societal interests.329 The First Amendment implicates more than just the
speaker; the public also has an interest in hearing government employees’
contribution to civic discussion.330 This is precisely why the First
Amendment was created: to encourage diverse and vibrant dialogue on
matters that affect the public without fear of repercussion from the
government.331 The Supreme Court in Garcetti recognized the duality
between a public employer’s need to perform essential government functions
while simultaneously operating under the constraints of the First
Amendment.332
This Note acknowledges that Garcetti should still serve as the appropriate
framework for determining whether speech by public school employees is
protected by the First Amendment but urges courts to heed its limitations.333
Garcetti expressly cautioned against creating excessively broad employment
duties to blanket all speech that employees make on the job.334 Yet, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Kennedy leaves little room for teachers to engage in any
type of private speech on school premises. While teachers do often serve as
moral exemplars to their students, their official job does not include serving
as role models in their every statement. Broadly interpreting Garcetti
otherwise enables employers to fire their public school employees for speech
and prayer made occasionally as private citizens in a place where occasional
private discourse can be the most valuable.335 If all speech that teachers
engage in “between the first and last bell of the school day” is considered the
school’s speech, regardless of whether that speech is instructional or
noninstructional, teachers, as citizens, have little First Amendment rights
left.336 This is particularly troublesome for private religious expression,
which implicates free exercise rights, as well as free speech rights.337
328. This Note assumes that religious expression is a matter of public concern. See supra
note 274 and accompanying text; see also Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp.
2d 536, 559 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Corbin, supra note 196, at 1218.
329. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006).
330. Id.; see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S 563, 573 (1968).
331. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420; San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
332. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 223–24. Though the Supreme Court left the
question of academic freedom open, circuit courts have found that an exception typically
pertains to university faculty and is beyond the scope of this Note. See Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Participation in Public Programs—Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 115, 187 (1992) (“Nor should a college professor be forbidden to discuss his religious
beliefs in class or in after-class meetings, when other members of the faculty are free to discuss
their personal and professional opinions.”); supra notes 225, 261 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
335. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857
(2022) (mem.).
336. Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th 910, 935 (9th Cir. 2021) (O’Scannlain, J., statement regarding
denial of rehearing en banc).
337. See supra Part I.A.2.
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This Note proposes that a public school employee should be able to engage
in a brief, quiet prayer, on physical school premises, within students’ view.
Whether the content of the religious speech is otherwise problematic or
constitutionally impermissible is a separate inquiry.338 Garcetti proposes a
content inquiry, which turns on whether an employee’s speech is made
pursuant to job duties, not whether that employee is simply working when
she engages in speech.339 In Garcetti, the district attorney’s memo “owe[d]
its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”340 But
government employment is not a precursor to prayer. A teacher’s or coach’s
prayer has little to do with the job of teaching or coaching; it is a practice that
many citizens engage in across the country.
Even when generally tasked with teaching students or delivering game
plays on the field, a public school instructional employee who engages in a
brief personal prayer is not instructing students as an employee; she is
speaking as a citizen.341 The crux of protecting this speech right lies in the
fact that this type of prayer is not intended to be formally or informally
instructional. Furthermore, because it embraces an individual’s free speech
right, religious prayer deserves treatment equal to nonreligious speech.342
Just as a secular teacher may demonstratively observe a moment of
reflection, a religious teacher may engage in brief, quiet prayer. The U.S.
Department of Education’s guidance on constitutionally protected prayer
supports such reasoning: “Teachers also may take part in religious activities
such as prayer even during their workday at a time when it is permissible to
engage in other private conduct such as making a personal telephone call.”343
Recognizing and allowing a free speech carveout would still only result in
incidental benefits to employees and would not violate the prohibition against
the “primary advancement” of religion, as urged by the Supreme Court in
Widmar.344
The Ninth Circuit attempted to make a distinction in Kennedy by indicating
that a teacher’s “off-duty” religious expression could be protected.345
However, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that Kennedy’s duty as a coach
was to “impart[] knowledge and wisdom” would render all speech he makes

338. For example, if that speech is lewd, vulgar, or offensive; elicits drug use; or causes a
substantial disruption, it would not deserve First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Forster,
supra note 17, at 691. This Note does not address this separate inquiry.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 219–21.
340. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
341. See supra notes 313–15 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. Arguably, due to its unique
implications for being religious speech, prayer could warrant an additional Free Exercise
carveout from Garcetti.
343. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer and Religious Expression in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools, 85 Fed. Reg. 3257, 3267 (Jan. 21, 2020) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter Protected Prayer Guidance].
344. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980). See supra notes 147–49 and
accompanying text for an elaboration of this Lemon prong.
345. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022)
(mem.).
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as falling within the scope of that ‘duty’ and be subject to discipline.346 This
Note argues that the scope of a teacher’s duties must be interpreted more
narrowly, in line with Garcetti, to allow teachers the right to engage in a brief
prayer, even when generally tasked with other responsibilities. This
formulation would allow teachers or coaches, like Kennedy, to assert a valid
First Amendment claim when they engage in religious prayer in front of their
students.
Importantly, this Note proposes a critical distinction in its interpretation of
Garcetti. If a teacher or coach is legitimately tasked with improving player
morale or guiding students through college decisions, for example, and
religious prayer becomes speech made on the job, that employee can be
subject to discipline without First Amendment protection. This is because
the speech in question is no longer a private prayer; instead, the employee is
speaking to students with the primary purpose of doing her job, a task she is
completing pursuant to her official responsibility. This Note argues that this
exception should be a limited and fact-dependent one; those tasks—
improving player morale or guiding a student through a rocky admissions
process—must be prescribed or, at a minimum, commonly understood as part
of the teacher’s job responsibility.347
This is a delicate distinction in the school context due to the multifaceted
responsibilities enjoyed by our nation’s public school employees.348 For
teachers and coaches, aiding students in their journey through adolescence
implicates their interests both as a teacher and as a citizen.349 The speech
they engage in does not only “owe its existence to [their] professional
responsibilities,” for when they give advice or moral guidance, they often are
doing so in a civilian capacity as well.350 Teachers and coaches, particularly
in secondary schools, play a vital role in students’ lives.351 Students often
defer to a teacher’s advice or follow their coach’s example, sometimes with
more vigor than they would their own parents.352 However, this fact cannot
override the employee’s First Amendment protections. Permitting teachers
346. Id. at 1015.
347. For example, in Borden, the coach conceded that organizing prayers and bowing his
head were tools that he used “to teach his players respect and good moral character.” Borden
v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008). This could warrant discipline
because “his coaching methods are pedagogic.” Id.
348. See Spurgeon, supra note 272, at 414 (“The mandate [from Garcetti] to lower courts
is to determine if the speech could have been made by a citizen outside of public
employment.”).
349. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 432 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Indeed,
the very idea of categorically separating the citizen’s interest from the employee’s interest
ignores the fact that the ranks of public service include those who share the poet’s ‘object . . .
to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation.’” (quoting ROBERT FROST, TWO TRAMPS IN MUD
TIME, in COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson
eds., 1995))).
350. See Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th. 910, 937 (9th Cir. 2021) (O’Scannlain, J., statement
regarding denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
351. See David Blazar & Matthew A. Kraft, Teacher and Teaching Effects on Students’
Attitudes and Behaviors, 39 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 146, 163 (2017).
352. See Geier & Blankenship-Knox, supra note 36, at 77.
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and coaches to engage in private speech or religious expression in front of
students safeguards a unique freedom that deserves “vigilant protection” in
American schools.353 Garcetti should be read to allow teachers such First
Amendment protection when they engage in private religious expression in
front of their students.
In Kennedy’s case, his initial motivational speeches to players, which
included religious expression and prayer, fell within the scope of his job
duties.354 He delivered those speeches for the purpose of leading his students
to triumph in games, a task prescribed to him as a coach.355 The school
district asked him to cease mentions of religion in these motivational
speeches, and he obeyed.356 Had the district’s suspension been due to this
continued conduct, Kennedy’s speech would not warrant First Amendment
protection. However, Kennedy also engaged in brief prayers following the
game, which he conducted quickly “after the customary handshake with the
opposing team.”357 These prayers that Kennedy expressed, uttered in the
same timespan as “making a personal telephone call,”358 ultimately resulted
in his suspension.359 These prayers warrant free speech and free exercise
protection because Kennedy prayed primarily for his own private religious
expression, not to lead players to victory.360 Kennedy’s brief religious
expression is not the school district’s speech and, as such, should be entitled
to First Amendment protection. Even though Bremerton’s football players
may see Kennedy as a role model in this setting, he is not engaging in
instruction with this prayer.
While a teacher’s or coach’s prayer should warrant protection under the
First Amendment, this Note argues that a compelling governmental interest
can still serve to override a free speech claim under Pickering.361 A school
district can therefore cite an Establishment Clause concern as their
compelling governmental interest, so long as that concern is valid.

353. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
354. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2021) (Christen, J., concurring), cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.).
355. See id. at 1023–25.
356. See id. at 1111–12.
357. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 6, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 857
(2022) (No. 21-418), 2021 WL 6118271, at *6.
358. Protected Prayer Guidance, supra note 343.
359. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1013.
360. Id. at 1010; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S.
Ct. 857 (2022) (No. 21-418), 2021 WL 6118271, at *4.
361. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (“The Free Exercise Clause embraces
a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the
First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state
intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.”); supra
Part I.B.
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B. Interpreting the Establishment Clause to Override a Public School
Employee’s Right to Pray
Even with First Amendment protection, a government employer can
justify overriding that employee’s rights under Pickering if its interests
outweigh the interests of the teachers.362 Because both the free speech and
free exercise rights of the employee are challenged, this part will argue that
the state must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest.363 This Note
proposes that the courts’ inquiry as to whether private speech implicates the
Establishment Clause should turn on whether (1) a state actor engaged in the
prayer and (2) students were psychologically coerced into engaging in
religious activity.364 The first factor is readily satisfied by any instructional
employee or school official employed by an American public school.365 The
second requires a case-specific, fact-dependent analysis. This Note further
argues that when a school incorrectly cites an Establishment Clause concern
as grounds for disciplinary action where no violation exists, that employee’s
speech is entitled to free speech and free exercise protection from an
otherwise school-deferential Garcetti application.
The use of psychological coercion as the decisive second factor allows
ample space for teachers and coaches to engage in personal prayer at lunch,
before class, or on school grounds, while disallowing them to lead or coerce
students in prayer. The psychological coercion standard from Engel and
Schempp that resurfaced in Lee and Santa Fe fundamentally looks to whether
the religious practice created an undue pressure for students to participate in
religious activity.366 Factors from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Lee and
Santa Fe—including, most importantly, the compulsory nature of
attendance, the level of school involvement, the identity of the person
delivering the prayer, and which activities that person elicits from students—
can aid that inquiry.367 This psychological coercion can be intentional or in
effect. For example, a teacher who audibly engages in prayer at the front of
362. See supra Part II.B.1.
363. Pickering does not require courts to conduct strict scrutiny review under the balancing
test, but this Note reasons that this type of review may be warranted when an employee’s free
speech and free exercise rights are implicated. The assessment of the types of disciplinary
action that would qualify as the “least restrictive means” of achieving a compelling
governmental interest is beyond the scope of this Note; however, the panel in Kennedy lightly
discussed this. See Kennedy IV, 4 F.4th 910, 925 (9th Cir. 2021) (Smith, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing en banc), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.).
364. As noted above, a school district could affirmatively endorse religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause. This assessment would turn on a fact-intensive approach. This
Note maintains that, in Kennedy, the school district could not have endorsed religion simply
by allowing Kennedy to continue the prayer in question.
365. See, e.g., Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (explaining that “school authorities are state actors for
purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process”). This
Note stipulates that teachers and coaches are school authorities but distinguishes these types
of public school employees from those employed in noninstructional capacities, like sanitation
workers, lunch administrators, or security guards.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 115–17.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
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his class may implicate Establishment Clause concerns if he asks students to
join their hands in prayer, recites that prayer during curricular instruction, is
a member of the clergy, or engages in prayer for an extended amount of
time.368 Conversely, this Note reasons that a teacher who briefly engages in
prayer at her desk, without eliciting participation from students or eating up
class time, would not psychologically coerce religious participation and
would not implicate the Establishment Clause. This Note’s formulation—
which, to find an Establishment Clause violation, requires a determination
that a state actor’s prayer psychologically coerced student religious
participation—protects the fundamental rights of both students and
instructional school employees.369
Some may reason that psychological coercion is too high a bar to safeguard
religious liberty in our nation’s schools, but this Note maintains that relying
on the endorsement test alone is incorrect in this type of Establishment
Clause case.370 As Justice O’Connor points out in Santa Fe, private religious
speech cannot endorse religion because endorsing religion requires the
religious activity to originate from state action.371 A school that simply
allows a teacher’s personal prayer is not endorsing that religion because that
prayer is private speech.372 In Santa Fe, the written school policy creating
election procedures for selecting pregame invocations was blatant state
action.373 In Lee, the level of school involvement in selecting clergymen to
deliver prayers was critical but not dispositive, but the coercive nature of
those prayers and the obligatory attendance of students was.374 A state
statute legislating prayer recitation into public school instruction is not
equivalent to private religious expression, the latter of which the Supreme
Court has historically allowed on school premises.375 As the Court noted in
Mergens, secondary school students are more than capable of understanding
the difference between a high school permitting private religious speech and
sponsoring religious practice.376
In applying this coercion standard to the Kennedy case, this Note maintains
that Kennedy’s personal prayers evolved into psychologically coercive
religious speech, in derogation of the Establishment Clause. Because
Kennedy is a salaried high school football coach, he is a state actor during

368. See supra notes 83–108 and accompanying text.
369. Of course, legal coercion would also violate the Establishment Clause, if, for example,
a teacher threatens to lower a student’s grade unless the student prays.
370. See supra note 115–18 and accompanying text.
371. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n Establishment
Clause violation must be moored in government action.”); supra notes 97–99, 109–12 and
accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 314–15 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83.
375. See supra Part I.B.
376. See supra notes 153, 155–56 and accompanying text.
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the school day on school premises,377 regardless of whether he engaged in
private speech. Having passed this Note’s threshold requirement, his speech
must be assessed for its coercive quality. First, it should be determined
whether student attendance during these postgame prayers was obligatory.378
Unlike in Santa Fe, where the general student body was not strictly required
to attend the football games, the football players in Kennedy do have an
obligation to attend the game and any pregame meetings.379 More
specifically, the football players, upon joining the team, must attend practice,
team meetings, and mid-game huddles, to name a few.380 When Kennedy
delivered his pregame prayers and motivational speeches, the coercion
inherent in compulsory attendance was present. However, these actions were
not at issue.
When Kennedy engaged in postgame private prayer, obligatory attendance
was less clear-cut. Originally, students requested to join Kennedy as he
prayed.381 The Supreme Court in Jaffree noted that nothing prohibits
students from voluntarily praying during school hours.382 However, over the
course of several years, Kennedy increasingly invited student players and
members of the opposing team to join him in prayer immediately after
games.383 Kennedy’s invitation, which resulted in large huddles of students
gathering around him, could render a single student’s participation
involuntary.384 Though Kennedy’s postgame prayers did not mandate
attendance from the players, they eventually obligated players, through peer
pressure, to at least respectfully participate, which the Supreme Court has
found to be coercive.385 Lee’s majority noted that even sitting in silence
during a clergy invocation can signify participation in a religious practice,
lending support for the conclusion that Kennedy’s prayers coerced student
participation in his religion.386
Accommodationist judges and scholars may argue that standing in silence
is not the correct formulation of psychological coercion and that this type of
respectful observance does not infringe on the free exercise rights of
students.387 However, students here did more than stand; they kneeled and
377. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1010–11 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857
(2022) (mem.).
378. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 107 and accompanying text; Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1011.
380. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1011.
381. Id. at 1010.
382. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); supra note 68 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text.
384. Pictures demonstrate that Kennedy kneeled, with his head down and with swaths of
his high school football team closely bowed together. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d 1004, 1019
(9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 857 (2022) (mem.).
385. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. If a teacher engaged in philosophical
secular meditation that students felt compelled to engage in, students could assert that their
right to free speech is violated, but this analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. The Court
has not resolved whether psychological coercion stretches to this same setting. But see Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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bowed alongside Kennedy as he prayed out loud.388 Even Justice Scalia in
his Lee dissent indicated that a school that coerces students to bow their heads
or place their hands in a prayer position could psychologically coerce
religious participation.389 Some may argue that Kennedy did not ask his
students to bow their heads or utter prayers alongside him; however, after his
history of leading motivational religious prayers and encouraging students to
join him, he has, in effect, inculcated student participation.390 The Third
Circuit in Borden specifically considered a coach’s own history with
initiating prayer to conclude that the prayer was coercive.391 Tellingly, when
Kennedy did not attend a few games, students did not self-initiate prayer.392
In fact, one student indicated that he felt he would not get playing time equal
to other students’ playing time if he did not join in prayer.393 Kennedy
exhibited a high degree of control over students, and in demonstratively
praying after delivering religious motivational messages, he coerced
religious participation.
This is a careful inquiry, however. Had Kennedy briefly prayed by himself
at the fifty-yard line, either during or following the games, his actions likely
would not rise to a valid Establishment Clause concern. Even in Kennedy,
no student or parent legally challenged Kennedy’s behavior or actions. For
the school to preemptively suspend him without this type of complaint
warrants a close review of both Kennedy’s and the school’s actions.394
Finally, the school’s reasoning for suspending Kennedy was incorrect
because the alleged endorsement violation was facially insufficient. This
Note reasons that, without affirmative school action, an individual state actor
who engages in prayer without a psychologically coercive aspect could not
violate the Establishment Clause. As Judge O’Scannlain noted, the issue in
Kennedy is not that the school district allowed the prayer to continue.395 The
school’s public opposition to Kennedy’s prayer could not signal that it
endorsed his religious practice or favored religion generally.396 Even if the
school district had ceased to publicly oppose his prayer, Kennedy’s religious
speeches would still have to coerce players into religious participation for
388. Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1012–13.
389. Lee, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
390. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1010–12; McConnell, supra note 50, at 701.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 304–06.
392. See Kennedy III, 991 F.3d at 1013.
393. See id. at 1011. Some scholars would argue that one student’s complaint is insufficient
to support the finding of an Establishment Clause violation, but this Note’s formulation does
not turn on that one student. See Patrick M. Garry, Distorting the Establishment Clause into
an Individual Dissenter’s Right, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 674 (2013); see also Kennedy
IV, 4 F.4th 910, 948 (9th Cir. 2021) (Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“Though one player expressed fear of mistreatment, there was no hint of actual evidence that
Coach Kennedy ever disfavored players based on their religious participation.”).
394. But see Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 181 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Another troubling consideration . . . is that a non-religious student or one who adheres to a
minority religion might feel subtle (albeit unintentional) coercion to participate in the ritual
despite disagreement or discomfort with it.”).
395. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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there to be a valid Establishment Clause concern. Ultimately, both
Bremerton School District and the Ninth Circuit incorrectly relied on the
endorsement test to determine whether Kennedy’s prayer violated the
Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
Teachers and coaches are deserving of First Amendment protection.
Broadly interpreting a public school employee’s duties to encompass all
potential speech they make while at school undermines the limitations the
Supreme Court imposed in Garcetti. Granting free speech and free exercise
protection to instructional employees who engage in private religious prayer
safeguards their fundamental rights and does so without infringing upon the
rights of students. This Note does not advocate for teachers to enjoy religious
free reign. Instead, this Note strikes an appropriate balance and recognizes
that the Establishment Clause is a vital and necessary protection that can
serve to override those free speech and free exercise rights. However, this
balancing of the Establishment Clause with the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses must be carefully and precisely executed to maintain the
integrity of the First Amendment.

